Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Insurance & Asset Protection

We learn in Business Organizations and other law school electives that corporations and LLCs protect their owners' assets. But how can the corporation or LLC protect its assets? David F. Rolewick of Rolewick & Gutzke, P.C. writes in the ISBA's Section on Corporations, Securities, and Business Law Forum "that insurance is first line of defense."

Insurance can protect against many potential liabilities and may come in the form of general liability, directors' and officers' liability, as well as umbrella insurance. Mr. Rolewick even provides a chart of different types of available insurance at the end of his article. He goes on to say that insurance policies may pay to defend litigation even if the litigation is over an issue excluded from the policy. However, he notes that the insurance company may reserve its right to "enforce the exclusion in a separate action." Still, having the litigation expenses covered may be invaluable because Mr. Rolewick points out that defending litigation may be a client's biggest exposure.

In conclusion, when setting up a LLC or a corporation to protect a client's asset, a practitioner may be wise to have the client consider insurance to protect the new entity's assets as well.
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Monday, March 30, 2009

Revamping the Regulations

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner finally opened the can of worms last week, proposing a far-reaching plan to reform the financial system. He said the system had failed “in fundamental ways” and would require comprehensive overhaul. “Not modest repairs at the margin,” he told Congress, “but new rules of the game.” Geithner's audience, the House Financial Services Committee, for once seemed to be satisfied with his presentation, which included regulating hedge funds and giving the government the power to seize and dismantle companies deemed a threat to the economy.

The key measures of Geithner's proposal include:

  • Creating a new "sytemic risk regulator" that would have the authority to scrutinize and second-guess the operations of bank holding companies like JPMorgan Chase, insurance conglomerate American International Group and other institutions that are too big to fail.
  • Establishing a mechanism to seize and dismantle large institutions whose collapse or bankruptcy might threaten the nation's financial stability.
  • Passing tougher requirements for the amount of money and assets that financial institutions need to have on hand so they can withstand economic troubles.
  • Requiring hedge funds, private-equity firms and other private investment funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and tell it about their risk-management practices.
  • Setting up a new, comprehensive framework of regulation of derivatives, including a central clearinghouse for trades in that market.
  • Developing stronger requirements for money market funds so increased withdrawals won't threaten the broader financial system.
Many of these proposals should generate a big welcoming, addressing dangers that clearly could have been addressed with simple regulatory reform. In the months ahead, Geithner said he will unveil more detailed proposals.

Nonetheless, a New York Times editorial posted today talk about the big underlying issues that Congress and the administration need to keep in mind. For instance:
  1. Is too big too fail actually exist? Such firms, like A.I.G., have proved dangerous mainly because of their involvement in a web of often conflicting financial practice and products. Geithner has called for a single regulator to police the most powerful institutions and presumably intervene in order to seize and restructure if failure seemed imminent. But, at what point should a firm ever even come close to become "too big" -- i.e. too diverse, too interconnected -- too fail?
  2. What are we trying to fix, anyway? Does anyone understand, with specificity, what brought on the financial meltdown? Can anyone actually sort out how much of the crisis is due to regulatory failure, how much to recklessness and greed, or how much to fraud and manipulation? Without the answers, the reform effort will be at best, hit or miss.
  3. Who is to carry out the reforms? For the last 30 years, there has been a serious political movement against regulation and for deregulation. In the last 10 years alone, opponents of financial regulation (e.g. Alan Greenspan) have been especially succesful in dismantling our financial regulatory scheme-- letting the market forces run free. As a result, the very agencies that were formed to protect our interests struck out -- big time. So if there is going to actually be meaningful regulatory reform, the rules will only be the first step.
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Monday, March 2, 2009

Bankers Need to be More Susceptible to Risk


A piece in last Wednesday's Wall Street Journal argues that Wall Street's casual approach to risk was due to the abandonment of the partnership model in favor of the corporation.

[I]n a $14 trillion economy, you can't hire enough overseers to pore over everyone's books. There is, however, a better solution: expose players in the financial game to greater personal loss if their risk-taking fails. When you worry that a mistake will cause you to lose your second home, your stocks and bonds and your club memberships, then you're less likely to take the kinds of risks that expose the rest of society to your failures. A simple mechanism exists to achieve this purpose: the private partnership. Partners face liability that extends to their personal assets. They aren't protected by the corporate shield that limits losses to what the corporation itself owns (as well as the value of the stocks and bonds the corporation has issued).

[I]nvestors -- and governments -- should recognize the extra safety inherent in doing business with partnerships. In the end, the partnership -- not more regulatory intrusion -- is an efficient, even elegant, answer to the thorny risk-mitigation problem. Partnerships are less likely to make big mistakes, but, even if they do, their smaller size means they pose less of a threat to the financial system as a whole, and to the taxpayers who have to pay for the clean-up.
Indeed a compelling argument. On the other hand, Professor Larry Ribstein, of Ideoblog, thinks otherwise. While he does strongly believe that the role of the corporation needs to change, he states that "[o]ver the last generation, better governance technologies have evolved through private equity, venture capital and hedge funds. This should be the model for the reorganization of Wall Street."
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Friday, February 27, 2009

Corporate Governance Standards under TARP - the Rundown

When it comes to TARP (and by TARP I mean the EESA, and by the EESA I mean the ARRA), everyone’s talking about compensation limits. But there is a lot more to the new standards imposed on recipients of TARP funds by the recent legislation, and this is your one-stop, ten-minute guide.



What is TARP/EESA/ARRA?

TARP is the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was established under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). The language of TARP was then slightly amended and finalized in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009.

You can access the full text of the ARRA
here, and the section on corporate governance and compensation limits - Division B, Title VII, Section 7001 - is at the very end. You can also access the full text of the EESA here.

What are the corporate governance requirements under TARP as amended?

All TARP recipient companies are required to establish and follow certain standards. Some are pretty non-controversial, while others might surprise you.


  • Unnecessary and Excessive Risks - Limits on incentives that encourage Senior Executive Officers (SEOs) to take “unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value” of the company while TARP funds are still owed.

  • Clawbacks - Recovery of any bonus paid out to a SEO or the next 20 most highly-compensated employees, if that bonus was “based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to be materially inaccurate.”

  • Golden Parachutes - Prohibition on any golden parachute payment made to a SEO or the next 5 most highly-compensated employees paid out while TARP funds are still owed. “Golden parachute payment” is defined in the previous section as “any payment to a senior executive officer for departure from a company for any reason, except for payments for services performed or benefits accrued.”

  • Long Term Restricted Stock - Prohibition of any bonus or incentive compensation other than long-term restricted stock, provided that the stock does not fully vest while TARP funds are still owed, and is not greater than 1/3 of the receiving employee’s total annual compensation. This one is unique, however, because the amount of employees it applies to depends on how much in TARP funds the company has received. The number is a sliding scale between 1 and 20, but each level includes a clause that states “or such higher number as the Secretary may determine is in the public interest” - hence the numbers are just a minimum guideline.

  • Manipulation of Reported Earnings (or what I like to call the “duh” provision) - Prohibition of any compensation plan that would “encourage manipulation of the reported earnings” so as to increase compensation of any of employees.

  • Compensation Committees - Establishment of a Board Compensation Committee that is “comprised entirely of independent directors” and meets at least semi-annually. TARP recipients that are privately-held may have their Board of Directors stand in for the independent compensation committee.

  • Luxury Expenditures - Establishment of a “company-wide policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures” such as “entertainment or events; office and facility renovations; aviation or other transportation services.” (See Bank of America, Northern Trust, Merrill Lynch, the Auto CEOs, et al. I think we’re all pretty familiar with why this section was necessary.)

  • Certification of Compliance - The CEO and CFO of each TARP recipient has to file a certification of compliance; if the company is publicly traded, the compliance certification goes with the annual SEC filings. As those of us who have taken Securities Regulation know, certifying compliance can be a painstaking and risk-laden process, but that’s why you keep attorneys around.

Now here are some of the more interesting requirements:

  • Say-on-Pay - All TARP recipients must institute a say-on-pay policy. A say-on-pay provision is a non-binding advisory vote by shareholders on executive compensation plans as disclosed in the CD&A section of SEC filings. Boards do not have to follow the results of the shareholder vote, but are strongly encouraged to do so. Say-on-pay has had some momentum in recent years, mostly from institutional investors, but this is the first time the practice has been mandated in any way.

  • Retroactive Review of Executive Compensation - The Treasury must review all “bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation” paid out to SEOs and the next 20 most highly-compensated employees for each TARP recipient to “determine whether such payments were inconsistent with” the purposes of TARP or contrary to the public interest. If the Treasury finds inconsistency, they will negotiate appropriate reimbursement to the federal government. Okay, but here’s the catch - while most people are assuming that the Treasury is only going to be reviewing 2008 and 2009 bonuses, there is no actual time limit to retroactivity set out in the legislation. While a recipient could argue that bonuses paid out before 2008 were irrelevant to the current economic crisis or to the compensation limits in the legislation, the Treasury still retains the right to review any compensation practices for the applicable employees going back in time indefinitely.

  • Repayment - This section was added to the legislation after opponents of Barney Frank’s amendments (say-on-pay) argued that we were getting ahead of ourselves in oversight. Therefore, TARP recipients reserve the right to repay TARP funds “without regard to whether [they have] replaced such funds from any other source.” Also, the Treasury must liquidate warrants associated with the recipient’s funds at the current market price. While understandable that the emphasis here is on repayment, this provision has the potential to be incredibly dangerous.

So what now?

Look for more discussion on say-on-pay initiatives. Say-on-pay is a very effective way for boards to give the appearance of relinquishing control over executive compensation while not really being bound to the shareholders’ decision. But it also carries the power to make boards accountable by highlighting situations when they choose to override shareholders’ decisions, and perhaps pay the consequences with a proxy fight.

Also, it will be interesting to see the how the final section on repayment plays out. I know we’re getting ahead of ourselves discussing repayment already, but the fact that TARP recipients themselves have the power to decide how and when repayment takes place puts the spotlight squarely on the corporate boards who are seen as having created the mess in the first place.


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Sunday, February 22, 2009

RiskMetrics Group Webcast – The Downsides to Executive Compensation Limits

RiskMetrics Group held a webcast yesterday highlighting key points for the upcoming proxy season, and much of the hour focused on the future of executive compensation.

I thought it was particularly noteworthy when one of the speakers emphasized the need for clear, direct ruling and recommendations – specifically from the SEC – on the new compensation limits and how they will be most effective. He brought up three unintended but likely consequences of the compensation limits:

  1. An executive race to the bottom – because the compensation limits only apply to companies that receive TARP funds, executives may be more likely to leave firms where their compensation is limited for firms that never had to receive TARP funds in the first place.
  2. Inappropriate emphasis on repayment – because the compensation limits only apply until the government funds have been repaid, executives may be more likely to repay the loans back more rapidly than is prudent for the interests of the firm and its shareholders so as to relieve themselves of compensation limits.
  3. Self-imposed restraints – because the compensation limits only apply to certain members of a firm such as corporate officers and directors, capable and talented executives may avoid being promoted so as not to be subject to the compensation limits.

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NY Times Economix Blog Joins the Discussion on Executive Compensation

The Economix blog argues against traditional economics-based models of executive compensation.


Ideally, boards would act as faithful representatives of the shareholders. Therefore, boards are assumed to structure the compensation of executives to also be aligned with shareholders’ interests. This is a phenomenon known as “optimal contracting,” with shareholders as principals and board members as their agents.

How often optimal contracting actually occurs, however, is up for debate. The Economix blog defers to the book “Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation” to make its argument.

The authors of Pay Without Performance argue that American corporate governance really functions under a “managerial power” model, where CEOs enjoy enough power over boards to dictate their own compensation, subject only to an “outrage” constraint. The “outrage” constraint is described in the book as the shareholders’, the media’s, and the public’s reaction to what they might learn about executive compensation, thus rooting the success or viability of compensation on the practice of secrecy. This worked for a long time, as compensation was broken up to into multiple components not easily summarized in a single figure – that is, until the SEC required corporations to disclose more detail on executive compensation.

So can we characterize the current legislation on executive compensation limits as this “outrage” to which the authors of Pay Without Performance referred? How far will we take this outrage? What other forms might it take in the future? What will be the most effective channel for this public outrage - and will our normal democratic channels be enough to quell the public?
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Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Shareholders are NOT The Answer!

Recently, Carl C. Icahn (chairman of a publicly traded diversified holding company) wrote an opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal suggesting some changes that he feels are necessary to help revive the private sector of the economy. While it is clear that regulation change is coming, it is unclear to what extent and where exactly the change will be felt – it may be changes to credit rating agency regulation, securities regulation, etc. Icahn calls for a change to corporate governance rules, allowing the shareholders more rights to make decisions within the corporation. His initial proposal calls for enhanced rights for shareholders to elect new boards, submit proposals, and provide input for issues such as executive compensation. Further, he calls for Congress to limit management’s ability to remove these rights from shareholders. Mr. Icahn is clearly pointing blame to directors and officers of corporation for excessive risk taking and poor judgment in running businesses into the ground. His proposal would tighten up oversight of the board’s performance and would, in theory, produce more effective boards.


However, Icahn fails to address some problems that his proposal would create. For instance, allowing shareholders enhanced rights to make business decisions removes the expertise from the decision making – shareholders do not run the day-to-day operations of a business because they likely do not have the expertise that the elected board and hired officers do have. While each shareholder may feel a greater sense of freedom and ability to affect the corporation which he or she owns, the aggregate of attempted action by many shareholders may add up to be a major waste of corporate resources. Shifting the power to the passive investor shareholder does not seem to be the proper solution to the problems faced by the private sector.

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Monday, December 8, 2008

Delaware's Dominance Doomed?


The WSJ Law Blog has posted a story about the emergence of a new shareholder-friendly corporate governance law in North Dakota.  Delaware and it's corporation-friendly laws are home to a large majority of US corporations.  The reason for this is that DE has intentionally crafted its laws to welcome corporate officers and directors to a corporate-friendly environment where they are free to act reasonably without too much fear of litigation by shareholders.  

North Dakota's governance laws enable shareholders to exercise a little more control over their corporations' directors and officers.  The shareholder advisory vote and ability to consider executive pay are both aspects of the ND law that you will not find in Delaware.  Although these laws were enacted a year ago, there are only two publicly-traded companies that are incorporated in North Dakota.  It is unlikely for corporations to flock to ND; most boards and officers likely prefer the friendly confines of Delaware corporate law.
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Wednesday, November 19, 2008

DLA Piper Overhauls Partnership Structure


DLA Piper is taking a dramatically different approach to the recent economic downturn than most other large firms.


Rather than continuing with the current trend of laying off associates en masse, DLA Piper has decided to convert its two-tier partnership into a single tier of equity partners. Traditionally, DLA has had two levels within its partnership ranks - income partners, who do not have an ownership stake in the firm, and equity partners, who buy into the partnership with a capital contribution.

While the initial upside comes from an influx of cash from the potential 275 capital contributions, DLA should see continued savings by not having to pay the salaries of non-equity partners. Another direct consequence of this shift will be added pressure on partners to bring in clients; generating business is an enormously significant factor in partner compensation. John Cashman of Major Lindsey & Africa LLC, a legal industry recruiter, says that "it’s very clear to their (junior-level lawyers), it’s either up or out: We want business generators or worker bees. They want to send that message." And in this economy, that message is all the more crucial, especially to all of us future "worker bees" still in school.

One commentator has taken a positive approach to the restructuring, praising DLA Piper for purusing what appears to be a more pragmatic than reactive solution: "Instead of scapegoating associates, it looks like DLA Piper has taken a hard look at the underlying business model." I would have to agree.
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